I know I promised this more than a few days ago.
As they say, Life is what happens when you make other plans.
Anyway, this is a reconstruction of a presentation by the same name, from the North Carolina PatCon, because I didn’t make any notes from it, and the presentation was extemporaneous:
“Ground that forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who occupies it first has most of the empire at his command, is ground of intersecting highways.”
To begin, a bit of background. India is a country of competing politics. Not only is there the perennial contention between Hindus and Muslims, and the always-energetic internal election politics, but India is suffering from an occupying force. There is a long-extant communist insurgency infesting some 6-8 Eastern states in the country. It was launched by Mao, and indeed is usually called the Maoist insurgency, but sometimes is also referred to as the Naxal insurgency. Early on, it had some direct support from China, but eventually became self-sustaining. There are something like 30,000 insurgents in this movement. Most are armed with little more than melee weapons, and occasionally homemade firearms. There are a few elite cadres that rate weapons like ancient Kalashnikovs, but such weapons are relatively rare. Despite this primitive equipment, the Maoists are able to hold off the well-equipped and numerous Indian internal security forces, which are sometimes supplemented by the Indian Army.
These Maoists control the majority of the Eastern states of India, particularly outside the cities. In one state, for example, all but 6 districts are under their control. In the districts where they hold sway, unarmed politicians and civil servants are often prime targets and rarely venture out, if they even dare to live in those areas. The insurgents’ weapons against the bureaucrats are often primitive roadside bombs, and they usually manage to bag at least one or two each time they set one off. The end result of this is that the Maoist groups are effectively the government in every area they are active, because the legitimate government doesn’t dare challenge them.
In recent years, the number of insurgents has been dropping, though slowly. This is due more to the gradual improvement of the living conditions of ordinary Indians, rather than any effort by the government. Despite this, the government does still try to maintain the appearance of control over the Maoist areas and the insurgency in general. The prime method of demonstration is the so-called “fake encounter” where government forces either outright attack innocent villagers claiming that the village is an insurgent stronghold, or, in the event that they are able to actually corner some small group of insurgents, the government forces force the situation, sometimes even having someone open fire on them so they can claim the insurgents fired first. These encounters, and indeed the majority of anti-insurgent operations, barely nibble at the fringes of the movement, and are just as likely (if not more so) to provoke the insurgents into redoubling their efforts as they are to demoralize the insurgents. Such “fake encounters” are frequently, and often easily, exposed, either by the Maoists or by citizens who witnessed the whole event. This has the net effect of diminishing the legitimacy of the Indian government, though there is not always a corresponding boost to the insurgents.
The key takeaway for patriots and IIIpers in the US today is the inability of the government to successfully challenge an internal insurgency, The Naxalites are holding off the Indian government with a few ancient Kalashnikovs, some bags of fertilizer, and handmade firearms. Granted there are differences between their situation and that of the US. Here, the government has more tools at its disposal, including things like drones and FLIR, as well as greater discipline and virtually unlimited supplies of cash and manpower. Patriots here do not enjoy the terrain advantage the Naxalites do. The jungles of India are far more impenetrable than the upland hardwood forests of, say, New York. Even the denser forests and swamplands of the Deep South offer little better concealment. However, US patriots have far better tools and weapons at their disposal as well, and are often far better trained. Many of the Naxals are illiterate peasants, while many US patriots are experienced military combat veterans.
We know the government is scared. The MIAC report and other statements about “domestic terrorists” and “right wing extremists” more than bear that out. The massive overreaction by LE to the events in Boston, Dorner, Rudolph, and so many others just provides further evidence that the government can barely handle unstable lunatics, to say nothing of, say, a unit of trained patriots on a planned and rehearsed mission.
If there is an internal uprising here in the US, with organized bands (even small ones) of patriots putting pressure on the LE element, the government might get a few small wins here and there, but they will quickly be overwhelmed.
I’m going to depart slightly here from the PatCon presentation to note something: I am reminded of a passage from Matt Bracken’s “When The Music Stops”, where he mentions the ease with which barely-organized urban riots grind down LE (both city and federal). Imagine if you will, instead of several hundred mostly-selfish MUYs trying to loot televisions and terrorize suburban whites in downtown, a company-sized (and military-disciplined) unit of patriots carrying out missions out beyond the suburbs, where SWAT units and armories are thin on the ground.
With the Great Western Redoubt and the twin labyrinths of the Ozark and Appalachian highlands, patriots have many relatively-secure regions from which to establish their own “grounds of intersecting highways”. The Western Redoubt controls many of the Northern passes that allow transportation to the West Coast, as well as being within striking distance of one of the largest ports on that coast. The Ozarks hold the (current) most-travelled East-West Interstate highway (particularly for truck freight), I-40, and are close to the central North-South artery of I-35, as well as one of the largest distribution centers in the nation. It also provides easy access to the network of rivers that moves goods in and out of the Heartland, and is relatively close to the great ports of Houston and New Orleans. The Appalachian freeholds will enable control over the Eastern end of I-40, as well as the great North-South coastal road, I-95, and the Eastern ends of several big navigable rivers like the Ohio.
Those are some important Grounds of Intersecting Highways if I ever heard of any.